I will explore the hypothesis that there are exactly three fundamental but
incommensurable naive mental schemes to perceive and conceive processes
and actions. Each of these “process ontologies” is characterized by a
particular causal scheme. First, the “material” process ontology is
characterized by proximate causality, which means physical forward
causality. The active units are conceived as material objects, e.g., a
falling stone. Second, the “teleo-functional” ontology is characterized by
ultimate causality, which means that processes and actions are understood
in terms of “function”, “purpose”, or “goal”. The active units are
conceived as organisms, e.g., a lion hunting for an antelope. Third, the
“personal” ontology is characterized by free agency causality. The active
units are conceived as persons, e.g., a teacher reflecting the ethics of
examining students. These three process ontologies are incommensurable

Biology discerns evolution and development – both being concepts of development in a wider sense. ‘Development’ in the strict sense denotes ontogenetic processes while ‘evolution’ refers to the development of species. Similarly, adaptive biological processes can be classified either as phylogenetic adaptations or as adaptivity of individuals. Adaptivity comes either as phenotypic plasticity or as temporary physiological responses to changing conditions. In recent years, epigenetics and EvoDevo have shown that ontogenetic development and evolution are intertwined to a considerable degree. This also affects the distinction between adaptation and adaptivity. I will discuss ways to conceptualize the new ‘mixture’ of both. Though not capturing disjunct cases, the older distinction may remain a valuable tool for identifying aspects of complex processes.