I will explore the hypothesis that there are exactly three fundamental but
incommensurable naive mental schemes to perceive and conceive processes
and actions. Each of these “process ontologies” is characterized by a
particular causal scheme. First, the “material” process ontology is
characterized by proximate causality, which means physical forward
causality. The active units are conceived as material objects, e.g., a
falling stone. Second, the “teleo-functional” ontology is characterized by
ultimate causality, which means that processes and actions are understood
in terms of “function”, “purpose”, or “goal”. The active units are
conceived as organisms, e.g., a lion hunting for an antelope. Third, the
“personal” ontology is characterized by free agency causality. The active
units are conceived as persons, e.g., a teacher reflecting the ethics of
examining students. These three process ontologies are incommensurable

In recent years we have seen a relentless emphasis on brain-based
approaches in the human sciences, medicine and popular culture. While the
cognitive, social and affective neurosciences and the many new hyphenated
neuro-disciplines (such as neuro-education, neuro-economy or
neuro-theology) are amassing resources and attention, many of its
practitioners are confident that it is just a matter of time before rival
approaches to the understanding of mind, behaviour and ‘human nature’ are
superseded. Besides promising novel insights into the workings of human
capacities, neuroscience announces the advent of new technologies ranging
from pharmaceutical drugs to monitoring and detection devices with
wide-ranging civil and military uses.

Critical Neuroscience is the name of a project that takes issue with these
developments from a multi-disciplinary perspective. It aspires to
seriously bridge the social and anthropological study of the neurosciences

Biology discerns evolution and development – both being concepts of development in a wider sense. ‘Development’ in the strict sense denotes ontogenetic processes while ‘evolution’ refers to the development of species. Similarly, adaptive biological processes can be classified either as phylogenetic adaptations or as adaptivity of individuals. Adaptivity comes either as phenotypic plasticity or as temporary physiological responses to changing conditions. In recent years, epigenetics and EvoDevo have shown that ontogenetic development and evolution are intertwined to a considerable degree. This also affects the distinction between adaptation and adaptivity. I will discuss ways to conceptualize the new ‘mixture’ of both. Though not capturing disjunct cases, the older distinction may remain a valuable tool for identifying aspects of complex processes.