I will explore the hypothesis that there are exactly three fundamental but
incommensurable naive mental schemes to perceive and conceive processes
and actions. Each of these “process ontologies” is characterized by a
particular causal scheme. First, the “material” process ontology is
characterized by proximate causality, which means physical forward
causality. The active units are conceived as material objects, e.g., a
falling stone. Second, the “teleo-functional” ontology is characterized by
ultimate causality, which means that processes and actions are understood
in terms of “function”, “purpose”, or “goal”. The active units are
conceived as organisms, e.g., a lion hunting for an antelope. Third, the
“personal” ontology is characterized by free agency causality. The active
units are conceived as persons, e.g., a teacher reflecting the ethics of
examining students. These three process ontologies are incommensurable